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The Issue 
Price  pooling  has  long  been  used  as  a  means  to  deal  with  risk  in  the  marketing  of 
agricultural commodities. For commodities, product pooling may also generate potential 
benefits through economies of scale or the provision of market power. Yet there has also 
been a growing interest in product differentiation and the development of value chains as 
a means to increase returns to farmers. This article explores the question of whether price 
or  product  pooling  is  compatible  with  a  strategy  of  pro-active  product  differentiation 
through value chains. 
Implications and Conclusions 
An  important  distinction  should  be  made  between  price  pooling  as  a  risk  reduction 
strategy and product pooling as a means to generate countervailing market power. This 
article suggests that price pooling may indeed have a role to play within a value chain 
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pursuing product differentiation. The attractiveness of voluntary product and price pooling 
for producers participating in value chains depends on a number of factors, including the 
relative degree of producers’ risk aversion and the ability of differentiation strategies to 
reduce price variability for producers in the absence of pooling. 
Introduction 
There has been a strong move over the last 20 years toward an  emphasis on product 
differentiation as a means of increasing returns in agricultural supply chains – creating 
“value chains” – and, in particular, increasing the returns that farmers receive from the 
market  (Hobbs,  Cooney  and  Fulton,  2000).  Implicit  in  this  change  in  emphasis  is  an 
attempt to leave the “commodity” era of agricultural products behind (Gordon, Hannesson 
and Kerr, 1999). In the common perception, the production of a commodity has meant 
that one farmer’s output competed directly with the output of every other farmer who 
produced  the  same  crop;  any  attempt  by  an  individual  farmer  to  increase  the  price 
received for his/her output would be immediately undercut by other farmers. Of course, 
this  perception  is  too  simple  in  that,  unlike  industrial  production,  which  can  achieve 
narrow  product-quality  bands,  biological-based  agricultural  production  systems  always 
exhibit considerable quality variation. As a result, even for products that are considered 
commodities, marketing mechanisms have evolved to allow different prices that reflect 
the differences in quality, e.g., through the creation of grades that allow products to be 
sorted  and  auctions  that  produce  lot-by-lot  prices.  Thus,  there  would  seem  to  be  no 
inherent  conflict  between  differentiating  products  and  the  production  of  what  are 
commonly thought of as commodities. 
In  the  traditional  view  of  commodities,  however,  market  mechanisms  make  no 
distinction between quality differences that arise largely as a result of good fortune (e.g., 
having a perfect weather season in crop production) and those that arise from superior 
management. In terms of modern value chains, the focus is on the latter. Resources are 
expended specifically to provide a product of superior quality. This management approach 
has  two  aspects:  (1)  to  produce  a  superior  mix  of  existing  attributes  and  (2)  to  add 
characteristics that a basic commodity does not possess. The aim is to obtain a premium 
from the marketplace that more than offsets the additional resources required to produce 
the superior quality. This rewarding of effort is, in turn, often seen as antipathetic to the 
practice of price pooling that is observed in commodity markets. Pooling certainly alters 
the  incentives  pertaining  to  product  marketing.  This  article  explores  the  question  of 
whether price or product pooling is incompatible with a strategy of pro-active product 
differentiation.  
Product  pooling,
1  where  the  crops  or  livestock  of  a  large  number  of  farmers  are 
bundled together into large lots, does not seem compatible with a strategy of rewarding 
successful effort toward improving product quality. As there is no penalty for adding a 
lower quality to the lot, we have a producer system that parallels Akerlof’s consumer-Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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driven “lemons” problem, and quality will decline. Product pooling must be pursued for 
other reasons, such as the achievement of economies of scale or acquisition of market 
power that can offset the negative effects of the decline in quality. Price pooling, however, 
requires closer examination. 
Price Pooling and Marketing of Agricultural Products 
Price pooling is a mechanism to deal with risk. A price pooling strategy will be chosen 
voluntarily by individuals who exhibit two characteristics: (1) they are risk averse, and (2) 
they do not believe that any individual effort or strategy on their part can result in a price 
that is sufficiently above the average (or pooled) price to give a positive reward to their 
effort. An individual has a choice between accepting the market price at the time of sale or 
joining the pool and receiving the pooled price.
2 If the expected pooled price and the 
expected price from marketing individually are equal, a risk averse individual will choose 
the marketing method with the lower expected price variance. Conversely, a “risk lover” 
will choose the marketing method with the higher expected price variance. Assuming that 
a price pool reduces the variance of realized prices, for the risk lover the opportunities 
forgone from the possibility of receiving a price higher than the pooled price  will be 
valued more highly than the penalty arising when a price lower than the pooled price must 
be  accepted.  A  risk  lover  will  choose  not  to  join  the  price  pooling  scheme  unless, 
paradoxically, he believes he is better than the pool at reducing the variance of realized 
prices.
3 The opposite will be true for individuals who are risk averse. They will be willing 
to forgo the positive rewards from receiving a higher price to avoid the loss of income 
associated with having to accept a price lower than the pooled price. 
Risk averse individuals who can, or believe they can, engage in activities that will 
ensure a price consistently sufficiently above the pooled price to more than offset the 
costs of engaging in those activities will not be interested in joining a pool. On the other 
hand, if the individuals do not believe that they have sufficient information or skill to 
affect the marketing outcome through their own actions, then the pool is not inferior and 
risk averseness will dominate. 
Given that producers are not homogeneous in their risk preferences or in their abilities 
(or  perceptions  of  their  abilities)  to  anticipate  “better  than  pooled  price”  marketing 
opportunities,  it  is  not  surprising  that  mandatory  price  pooling  schemes  always  have 
dissenters – those who feel they are being disadvantaged because of forgone opportunities 
or because they are not allowed to act on their ability to correctly anticipate the market. 
While most producers are likely risk averse and, in many cases, the belief in superior 
forecasting ability may be illusionary, individuals with these characteristics will exist and 
it will not be possible to have all producers voluntarily join a pooling scheme. 
What kinds of markets have characteristics that are amenable to pooling activity? The 
first characteristic is volatility, both through time and in the size of the deviations from the 
pooled price. Farmers must pick a point in time to market their crops or livestock. Markets Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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whose  volatility  through  time  does  not  exhibit  clear  patterns  or  regularity  cannot  be 
anticipated.  Many  agricultural  product  markets  are  cyclical  in  nature.  Cycles  are 
sufficiently regular to be anticipated, meaning that larger numbers of producers may well 
feel confident they can correctly anticipate market prices and will not have an interest in 
joining a pool. Markets whose prices are affected by many exogenous factors are less 
likely  to  exhibit  discernible  patterns.  Further,  it  may  be  difficult  or  costly  to  acquire 
information  in  a  timely  manner  on  factors  that  affect  distant  markets.  This  was 
particularly the case in the past. Further, from a producer’s perspective, buyers had an 
advantage  in  acquiring  market  intelligence,  leading  to  transactions  under  asymmetric 
information,  with  the  advantage  reaped  by  the  buyer.  In  recent  years,  better 
communication, and particularly the Internet, has made it easier for individual producers 
to gather market intelligence.
4 As a result, pooling may attract fewer producers than in the 
past. 
Abstracting  from  the  costs  associated  with  administering  a  price  pool,  the  pooled 
price can be seen as the average price over some period of time. If the deviations from the 
average  are  small,  then  risk  aversion  is  likely  to  be  relatively  less  important  in  the 
decision to join a pool. In other words, the risk of losses associated with receiving a price 
lower than the pooled price may be acceptable to more producers. However, as the size of 
the downside deviations increases, more and more producers will be unwilling to risk low 
returns, and will voluntarily join the pool. Clearly, the configuration of deviations from 
the average of any movement of prices will affect the proportion of producers who will be 
willing to join a pool. For example, without having any discernible pattern through time, 
price  deviations  above  the  mean  could  tend  to  be  smaller  but  more  frequent.  These 
positive deviations could be offset by fewer but large deviations below the mean. This 
would lead to a very different distribution of firms wishing to join a pool than would be 
the case if both the positive and negative deviations were frequent and large.  
Pools must be closed over the period that the average prices are calculated, to prevent 
those who fared badly in the market from latterly joining the pool to gain the higher 
pooled price. In a similar fashion, opportunists must be prevented from leaving the pool 
when they can see a near-term price advantage. In either of these cases of opportunism 
toward  the  pool,  the  pooled  price  would  be  lowered,  increasing  the  incentive  for 
individual producers to leave the pool.  
If the objective is simply to offset the type of risk described above, there seems to be 
no impediment to voluntary pools, with some individuals accepting the market price when 
they sell and others being willing to pool their prices. If the pool is passive − simply 
accepting  market  prices  for  all  sales  and  then  averaging  the  prices  and  giving  each 
member of the pool the same price − then it does not matter if risk lovers or those who 
believe they can correctly anticipate the market price to their advantage are active in the 
market. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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The question then arises as to why compulsory pricing pools are put in place. In fact, 
what are called mandatory pricing pools may actually be product pools that are attempts 
to gain countervailing power in the market. It has long been a perception of farmers (and 
often  the  perceptions  were  correct)  that  as  a  result  of  the  asymmetric  information 
discussed  above,  and  due  to  the  geographic  dispersion  of  individual  farms  relative  to 
buyers (e.g., a number of farmers served by only one local grain buyer), buyers have more 
market  power  than  producers.  With  mandatory  product  pooling,  a  degree  of 
countervailing  market  power  may  be  gained.  This  may  be  particularly  the  case  if  a 
professional marketing organisation is put in place to administer the pool. Even if the 
administrators of the pool do not have the power to restrict the quantity of output globally, 
they may well be able to act strategically in the short run to obtain better prices. Further, a 
professional  marketing  arm  of  the  pool’s  administration  may  be  able  to  reduce  or 
eliminate asymmetric information. 
To have any degree of market power, however, the marketing arm must be able to 
control the timing of sales. It may also be advantageous to be able to assemble lots of 
various sizes. Thus, it may be administratively difficult to know what price was actually 
received for an individual producer’s output. Given that quantities are used strategically 
by the pooling agency, even if the price of each individual producer’s output could be 
discerned, higher or lower prices are not based on the producer’s ability to anticipate 
prices but rather on the ability of the pool’s marketing division to anticipate markets and 
to manipulate them successfully. Not all trades will be successful; others may provide a 
considerable premium. Any individual producer’s quantity contribution is subsumed in 
the larger strategy. As a result, pooling the prices received from these trades does not 
disadvantage any producer whose output may in fact have been sold to the lower-priced 
market. Thus, the pooled price is a convenient way to deal with equity among producers 
when strategic behaviour is being engaged in by the pooling agency. It may also satisfy 
the desire of risk averse producers to escape the downside risks associated with volatile 
prices, but this is a secondary benefit – the higher prices arising from the exercise of 
market power are the primary benefit. In this case, however, there must be compulsory 
membership. If risk lovers and those who believe in their superior ability to predict market 
prices are not forced to be part of the pooling system, they become direct competitors with 
the pool’s marketing arm, reducing or eliminating its ability to exercise market power. 
It  is  important  to  understand  this  distinction  and  to  be  able  to  separate  the  risk 
management  aspect  of  price  pooling  from  the  market  power  side  effect  that  yields  a 
pooled  price.  As  currently  constituted,  institutions  that  mandate  product  (and,  hence, 
indirectly price) pooling often justify it in the name of the secondary benefit of price risk 
management. 
None of these price pooling activities excludes quality premiums or discounts relative 
to the pooled price.  Producers making the effort to  provide high-quality products can 
receive  a  price  premium.  All  that  is  required  is  recognised  standards.  The  premium Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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received  however,  may  not  offset  the  extra  resources  required  to  produce  the  higher 
quality. This is true whether the pooling arises for reasons of risk management or to gain 
and exercise market power. 
Producer Price Pooling in Modern Value Chains 
In a sector where primary production is dominated by commodities, price and product 
pooling are logical responses for risk averse and competitive
5 producers who face volatile 
markets and (at least locally) monopsonistic buyers. Price pooling is a simple risk sharing 
mechanism,  while  product  pooling  is  a  means  to  collectively  garner  a  degree  of 
countervailing power in the market. This is a reasonable institutional response to being in 
a commodity industry. It is not the only possible response. One alternative is to alter the 
market structure so that producers are no longer producing a commodity. This product 
differentiation  strategy  has  received  considerable  attention  from  producers  and 
governments over the last two decades. While it has always been possible for individual 
producers to attempt to set their products apart from those of others through improving 
quality (and/or its consistency) or adding value, except for a few exceptional cases these 
remain cottage industries. Often these cottage industries have vertically integrated supply 
chains that market directly to the final consumer. This strategy provides a means for the 
individual farmer to capture the value that exists between the farm gate and the consumer. 
These cottage industries often lack the ability to attain economies of scale in processing 
and marketing and, hence, to contribute in a significant way to raising farm incomes or 
rural  revitalization.  Since  these  cases  are  centred  in  individual  farms,  the  question  of 
pooling has not arisen. 
Latterly, there has been interest in expanding the product differentiation strategy. To 
achieve economies of scale in processing and marketing, as well as to tap into major retail 
chains that demand both large quantities and consistency of supply throughout the year, 
collective marketing efforts, such as new generation co-operatives, are emerging. There 
has been interest in producer participation in other aspects of the “value” chain to garner a 
greater  portion  of  the  consumer  premium.  Whether  farmers  participating  in  new 
generation co-operative value chain initiatives would be interested in product and price 
pooling becomes a relevant question.  
As  long  as  individual  producers  receive  price  premiums  for  products  exhibiting 
superior quality, then product pooling can be the means to achieve economies of scale in 
processing. It can also satisfy the requirements of major retailers for large volumes and 
consistency in supply through time. There is no advantage to keeping the products of 
individual  producers  separate  through  the  supply  chain,  as  the  advantages  arise  from 
economies of scale and the provision of large volumes on a consistent basis. All products 
differentiated by quality through the new generation co-operative receive the premium 
and there is no advantage to further differentiating the products of individual farms. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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Whether  price  pooling  will  appeal  to  producers  participating  in  a  product 
differentiating  value  chain  is  a  more  complicated  question.  As  the  ability  to  increase 
revenue arises from differentiating the product by quality rather than garnering market 
power, a pooled price is not necessary to increase price. Hence, we are left with the price 
volatility issue. Based on the analysis in the previous section, a number of propositions 
can be put forward that form the basis of testable hypotheses for future research. 
Proposition 1: Participation in a closed value chain that co-ordinates the supply chain to 
extract  the  maximum  value  from  quality-based  product  differentiation  will  reduce  the 
price volatility faced by producers, hence lessening the incentive for producers to initiate 
a price pooling scheme. 
Retail prices tend to be much less volatile than commodity prices. Retail prices tend 
to exhibit stickiness due to the pricing strategies employed by retailers. In particular, if 
consumers are resistant to radical price changes, they could choose to shop at a rival retail 
store in future. Retailers may adjust their margins more easily than their prices. Thus, 
having producers participating in tightly co-ordinated value chains means that some of the 
retail price stability should be passed back down the chain. If this is the case, risk averse 
producers  will  perceive  less  benefit  from  price  pooling.  This  proposition  could  be 
examined empirically (depending on data availability) by comparing the relative volatility 
of  producer  prices  in  a  related  commodity  to  those  received  by  producers  who  are 
participants in supply chains that pursue product differentiation strategies. 
Proposition  2:  The  closer  a  differentiated  value  chain  product  is  as  a  retail  market 
substitute for another product that uses a commodity substitute as an input, the  more 
interest there will be in producer price pooling. 
While retail prices may be sticky, price competition is unlikely to be ignored. Assume 
there is a commodity substitute for the higher-quality output from the producer group 
supplying inputs for the value chain. If the price of the commodity substitute declines, the 
substitute retail product gains a price advantage in the retail market. To maintain market 
share the value chain will have to cut its retail price, and part of this price decline will be 
passed back to its producers. This effect will be stronger the closer is the substitution 
relationship between the retail products. 
On the other hand, if the price of the commodity input rises, the price of its associated 
retail product will also have to rise, creating an opportunity to increase the price of the 
value chain’s differentiated product. Some of this price increase may be passed back to 
producers (depending on the competitive structure of the downstream food processing and 
retailing sector).  In addition, as the price of the commodity substitute rises, producers of 
the  value  chain’s  input  will  find  the  commodity  market  an  increasingly  attractive 
alternative. This will threaten the security of the value chain’s specialized input supply 
and the cohesiveness of the value  chain’s producer  group. To  reduce the incentive to Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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supply the commodity market, the value chain will have to increase the price received by 
its producers. 
Hence, close substitutability leads to price volatility and an increased interest in price 
pooling  by  risk  averse  producers  supplying  the  value  chain.  A  low  degree  of 
substitutability  will  increase  the  isolation  of  the  value  chain’s  producers  from  the 
commodity  market.  Price  integration  between  differentiated  products  and  their 
commodity-based  substitutes  could  be  tested  at  the  retail  level.  The  producer  price 
variability  in  value  chains  that  have  closely  integrated  retail  prices  among  substitutes 
could be compared with price variability for those commodities whose retail products are 
not integrated. The expectation would be that volatility would be greater for products 
whose retail product prices are integrated (i.e., they are close substitutes). 
Proposition 3: The larger the proportion of the retail price made up by the output of 
primary producers, the greater the likelihood of an interest in price pooling by producers 
supplying inputs to the value chain. 
If a superior-quality input supplied to the value chain by producers has a commodity 
substitute with a volatile price, it will be more difficult to isolate the retail price from 
changes in the commodity price. On the other hand, if the input price is only a small 
proportion of the retail price, even a large degree of volatility in the overall commodity 
price will not be passed through to the retail price. Therefore, the value chain’s input 
prices will not exhibit the same degree of volatility as the commodity market. In this case, 
the value chain’s agricultural input suppliers will have less interest in price pooling. As an 
empirical test, the correlation between the volatility of value chain input prices and the 
proportion of the retail price made up by the input price could be tested. 
Proposition 4: If product differentiation is perceived as a “risky” strategy for producers 
then it will attract risk lovers and there will be little interest in price pooling. 
What  type  of  producers  are  attracted  to  new  generation  co-operatives  and  to 
participation in value chains that, at the very least, limit their freedom of action because 
they often entail working hand-in-hand with other players in the supply chain? Producers 
choosing to join a value chain may have to make asset-specific investments that leave 
them open to opportunism by others in the supply chain. The success of the venture may 
well  hinge  on  the  performance  of  other  suppliers  over  whom  little  control  can  be 
exercised.  Investments  may  be  necessary  in  processing  facilities  to  produce  a 
differentiated product whose market potential is only poorly understood, particularly as 
the product moves from a test market phase to an attempt to create a sustainable market 
niche. This business environment may be viewed as very risky and only attractive to risk 
lovers. 
If  the  majority  of  those  producers  joining  value  chains  to  exploit  the  premiums 
available  from  product  differentiation  are  risk  lovers,  then  they  are  also  likely  to  be 
attracted to price variability. They will not be interested in price pooling. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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The  risk  attitudes  of  producers  participating  in  new  generation  co-operatives  and 
value  chains  need  to  be  better  understood.  Surveys  of  participants  and  potential 
participants in these institutions could be conducted to determine their attitudes toward 
risk in general and price pooling in particular.  
Proposition  5:  If  participating  producers  view  product  differentiation  as  part  of  their 
ability to make strategic marketing decisions, then there  will be little interest in price 
pooling. 
If those who choose to participate in a product differentiation strategy had previously 
been chafing under a compulsory price pooling system, then they are not likely to want a 
price pooling scheme for producers supplying inputs to the value chain. On the other 
hand,  if  producers  join  the  new  generation  co-operative  because  they  do  not  believe 
individual producers can employ a strategy to improve their returns, then they are more 
likely to be interested in price pooling, just as they would in a compulsory pooling system. 
Producers that are participating (or are interested in participating) in a new generation 
co-operative  and/or  value  chain  could  be  surveyed  regarding  price  pooling  and  their 
ability  to  choose  a  strategy  that  will  increase  net  returns.  Until  producers  who  are 
interested in product differentiation strategies are better understood, the attractiveness of 
voluntary price pooling among value chain producers cannot be discerned. 
Conclusions 
Little is known about the role of product and price pooling within agricultural supply 
chains that are pursuing a strategy of product differentiation. While it may run counter to 
the conventional wisdom that product differentiation and price pooling are antipathetic, 
this article suggests that there is nothing inherent in price pooling that would exclude it 
from having a place within a value chain pursuing a product differentiation strategy. Of 
fundamental importance is understanding that price pooling is a risk sharing strategy and 
not a leveller of product quality. Price premiums for quality, and associated institutions 
such  as  grading  standards,  can  be  accommodated  in  price  pooling  schemes.  Pooling 
relates  to  the  movement  of  price  over  time  and  place,  and  quality  premiums  can  be 
calculated relative to the pooled price.  
The  attractiveness  of  voluntary  product  and  price  pooling  mechanisms  for  those 
producers participating in value chains appears to depend on a number of factors. The 
central issue for price pooling is price volatility. Risk lovers will see no value in price 
pooling. For those who are risk averse, the greater the volatility, the more attractive price 
pooling becomes. If price differentiation strategies reduce price variability for producers, 
then  pooling  will  become  less  attractive.  A  number  of  propositions  pertaining  to  the 
ability of value chains to reduce price variability are developed to set the stage for future 
research.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. E. Hobbs and W. A. Kerr 
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Endnotes 
1 It is assumed that the pooled products are not sorted by quality. Even if sorting takes 
place, if the quality bands are wide, there will be a decline in quality toward the floor of 
the band. 
2 The choice is actually more complicated because the cost of administering the pool must 
be subtracted from the total revenue received by the pool. As a result, the pooled price 
will be less than the average price. For simplicity we assume that the cost of administering 
the pool is sufficiently small to be safely ignored. 
3 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
4 It still might be argued that buyers, being larger, can afford to hire professionals to 
analyze  the  information  available  and,  hence,  retain  a  skills-related  information 
advantage. 
5 In a perfectly competitive market, producers are assumed to be price takers and to strive 
to  maximize  returns  given  the  price  they  face.  In  other  words  they  do  not  engage  in 
marketing  strategies.  This  is  similar  to  the  case  described  above  where  agricultural 
producers do not believe that any action taken by them will increase their net returns. 